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Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely 
Proposal 
Steven G. Calabresi† and David C. Presser∗ 
“Sir, in a country like this, it is of some importance that your 
judges should ride the circuits, not only to become practically 
acquainted with the different rules that govern the decisions in 
the different States of the Union, but that they may not forget 
the genius and temper of their government. Adopt the system 
now before you, and your supreme judges will be completely 
cloistered within the City of Washington, and their decisions, 
instead of emanating from enlarged and liberalized minds, will 
assume a severe and local character.”1 
“If the Supreme Court should ever become a political tribunal, it 
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 1. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 125–26 (1819) (statement of Sen. Smith). The 
authors are indebted to Joshua Glick’s informative Comment, On the Road: 
The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1753 (2003), for leading them to this and the following quote from the congres-
sional debates over circuit riding and for triggering Professor Calabresi’s 
memory of Professor Akhil Amar’s comments at the 1996 Federalist Society 
Symposium, which are contained in Federalist Society Symposium, Panel 
Four: Relimiting Federal Judicial Power: Should Congress Play a Role?, 13 
J.L. & POL. 627, 638–44 (1997) [hereinafter Panel Four]. 
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removed from the People, and within the immediate influence of 
the power and patronage of the Executive.”2 
The Justices of the Supreme Court have a lot of free time 
on their hands during the summer months,3 and most of them 
also have their best years behind them.4 Some, like Justice An-
thony Kennedy,5 spend their summers abroad in Europe6 and 
 
 2. 2 REG. DEB. 932 (1826) (statement of Rep. Buchanan). 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (“The Supreme Court shall hold at the seat of 
government a term of court commencing on the first Monday in October of 
each year and may hold such adjourned or special terms as may be neces-
sary.”). Much like a college on the quarter system, the Court is usually in re-
cess from late June or early July until October. See The Court and Its Proce-
dures, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/procedures.pdf (last visited Apr. 
10, 2006). 
 4. At the time of Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s death in 2005, the 
average age of the Justices was seventy-one (including two octogenarians and 
two septuagenarians). See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Lim-
its for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 769, 877 tbl. 2 (2006); see also Legal Info. Inst., Cornell Law Sch., Su-
preme Court Collection: Current Supreme Court Justices, http://supct.law 
.cornell.edu/supct/justices/fullcourt.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) (providing 
links to biographies of the Justices on the Court at the time of Rehnquist’s 
death). 
 5. “Every summer for the past fifteen years, Kennedy and his wife, Mary, 
have rented an apartment in Salzburg,” where he teaches a class called “Fun-
damental Rights in Europe and the United States” to ninety American stu-
dents and twenty students “from schools around the world.” See Jeffrey Too-
bin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could 
Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 44 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 6. The vacation patterns of the other Justices are quite similar to those 
of Kennedy. See, e.g., Justices Let Others Pick Up Tab in Summer Travels, L.A. 
TIMES, June 28, 2000, at A19A. Taking advantage of the fact that foreign and 
domestic universities often pay for the travel expenses of Justices and their 
spouses during the summer, see id., six out of nine Justices included continen-
tal cavorting in their summer itineraries in 1999: 
  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a guest lecturer at Tulane Uni-
versity Law School’s summer program in Greece (she traveled to the 
Netherlands as a guest lecturer the previous February). 
  Justice Stephen G. Breyer took on lecturing duties in Austria and 
Chile. 
  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor made it to Japan for a speech and 
discussions with faculty and students at Doshisha University in 
Kyoto. She also participated in conferences and meetings in Scotland 
and the Czech Republic. 
  Auckland, New Zealand, was Justice Antonin Scalia’s destination 
for a weeklong seminar sponsored by the University of Auckland. He 
also taught for two weeks at Hofstra University’s summer law school 
program in Nice, France. 
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bring European notions of constitutional “interpretation” back 
to bear on the constitutional questions before them on the U.S. 
Supreme Court.7 
This Essay considers whether there is a way, short of a 
constitutional amendment, to rein in the Justices’ transatlantic 
legal dalliances, while also encouraging aged, life-tenured Jus-
tices to retire. We contend that there is. The solution to both 
problems is to reintroduce the practice of circuit riding by Su-
preme Court Justices, which was abolished almost 100 years 
ago but which existed for the first 122 years of the Court’s his-
tory. We propose that the Justices be required to ride circuit for 
a four-week session in July following the recess of the Supreme 
Court’s annual Term, during what is now the Justices’ three-
month summer vacation. We note, as Chief Justice John Rob-
erts did early in his career, that “‘only Supreme Court justices 
and schoolchildren are expected to and do take the entire 
summer off,’”8 and we suggest a partial correction of that situa-
 
  Justice Anthony M. Kennedy made it to Salzburg, Austria, as a 
teacher for University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, and to 
Moscow, London and Edinburgh, Scotland, for others. 
  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist got his expenses paid for 
teaching at the University of London but turned over a $2,000 hono-
rarium to his church. 
Id. 
 7. For examples of the Court’s reliance on foreign sources of law, see the 
majority opinions authored by Kennedy in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
576 (2005) (citing, among other sources, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, “which every country in the world has 
ratified save for the United States and Somalia”), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (noting that COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES 
AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (authorized Am. ed., Stein & Day 
1963) (1957), a British report, advised the British Parliament to repeal anti-
homosexuality laws). Justice Breyer has also relied on foreign sources of law, 
such as in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida, 528 
U.S. 990, 995–99 (1999) (citing cases from the Privy Council of Jamaica, the 
Supreme Court of India, the Supreme Court of Canada, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, and a number of U.S. cases citing foreign decisions 
and policies). See also Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The 
Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice 
and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005). 
 8. Donna Cassata, Roberts Rises to Chief Justice Nominee, BOSTON.COM, 
Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2005/09/ 
05/roberts_rises_to_chief_justice_nominee?mode=PF (quoting an April 19, 
1983 memorandum written by Roberts). At the time of this statement, Roberts 
was serving as Associate Counsel to President Reagan in the White House 
Counsel’s Office. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www 
.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). 
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tion. During their one month of riding circuit, the Justices 
would preside over trials on the district courts of their respec-
tive circuits9 rather than hobnobbing in Salzburg with foreign 
luminaries. We propose to pay the Justices an additional 
$100,000 a year to compensate them for this added work, giv-
ing them a much-deserved salary increase and making clear 
that our goal is to reform and improve the functioning of the 
Court. We think circuit riding would get the Justices in touch 
with popular opinion outside of the Beltway, much as trips to 
their home districts and states do for representatives and sena-
tors. We also think the Justices would benefit from knowing 
more about the real-world impact their law of criminal proce-
dure is having in the district courts and from seeing the practi-
cal effects of the rules of procedure they promulgate.10 
We begin in Part I by discussing the constitutionality of 
circuit riding as it originally existed from 1789 to 1911. We 
show that although there was a vigorous debate on the Mar-
shall Court as to whether the original and very onerous circuit- 
riding system was constitutional, that debate was decisively 
and finally resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the prac-
tice. In Part II, we consider the constitutionality of our very 
modest circuit-riding proposal under modern Rehnquist Court 
Appointments Clause case law. We conclude that a modest cir-
 
9. Professor Calabresi would like to acknowledge as a source of inspira-
tion for this idea the proposal of his fellow panelist, Professor Amar, at the 
1996 Federalist Society Symposium. Professor Amar touched on the historical 
practice of circuit riding, noting that “[o]ne of the things circuit-riding did do is 
it took justices outside of Washington, D.C. It put them in touch with trials 
and with state law and with lots of other judges, and it perhaps created a dif-
ferent perspective on law in America.” Panel Four, supra note 1, at 639. At 
this panel, Professor Calabresi betrayed his own transatlantic leanings when 
he suggested that in order to put a limiting perspective on the Supreme 
Court’s power, 
Congress might want to consider by statute doing two things that 
Germany does with its constitutional court, and that is to move the 
Supreme Court to another part of the country to get it outside the 
Beltway. Perhaps, the Supreme Court should be moved to a city in 
the Sunbelt. The current Court is dominated by Northeasterners and 
Californians. Its decisionmaking reflects that perspective. It might be 
appropriate for a major institution of the national government to be 
based in some Sunbelt state given that a majority of Americans now 
live in that part of the country. 
Id. at 636. 
 10. Cf. id. at 643–44 (comments of Professor Amar) (“Because I actually 
think [the Justices have] been over-exuberant in criminal procedure, I would 
like them to actually see crime up close, in trials, and not just federal trials for 
white-collar crimes but murder, rape, and robbery cases as well.”). 
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cuit-riding plan of the type we propose would be constitutional, 
although onerous circuit-riding duties might well be unconsti-
tutional. In Part III, we look at the reasons why circuit riding 
was abolished, and we show that none of those reasons still 
holds true today. We thus conclude that none of the reasons 
that led to the abolition of circuit riding should preclude its be-
ing reestablished. Finally, in Part IV, we consider the norma-
tive case for reestablishing circuit riding. We think reintroduc-
ing circuit riding is a good idea for three reasons. First, it would 
get the Justices reacquainted with American values outside the 
Beltway, much as extensive domestic travel does for Presidents 
and members of Congress. Second, it might encourage the Jus-
tices to retire after about fifteen years on the bench, as they did 
on average between 1789 and 1970, rather than staying on av-
erage for twenty-six years, as they have done since 1970. Fi-
nally, it would help get the Justices out of the business of im-
porting foreign sources of law into American constitutional law. 
We think the reestablishment of circuit riding is an idea whose 
time has come. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ORIGINAL FORM 
OF CIRCUIT RIDING 
We begin with the question of the constitutionality of cir-
cuit riding as it existed from 1789 until its abolition in 1911, 
and we consider what the founding giants of our court system 
said and thought about that issue. Strikingly, John Jay, the 
very first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, expressed the be-
lief that the system of circuit riding set up by the Judiciary Act 
of 178911 was unconstitutional;12 but when push came to shove, 
he and the other Justices flinched rather than insist upon such 
a bold claim.13 
The original system of circuit riding to which Jay objected 
provided for three circuit courts in the northern, middle, and 
southern parts of the original United States.14 Beginning in 
 
 11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 12. See Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washing-
ton (ca. Sept. 13, 1790), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 89 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) 
[hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also discussion infra notes 22–29 
and accompanying text. 
 13. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 556 (1971); see also infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75. 
CALABRESI & PRESSER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:09:57 AM 
2006] REINTRODUCING CIRCUIT RIDING 1391 
 
1789, each circuit court was staffed with two Supreme Court 
Justices and one local district judge.15 In 1793, the system was 
reformed so that only one Justice, rather than two, was re-
quired.16 The cases these circuit courts heard included not only 
appeals from the district courts, but also trials of actions that 
were brought originally in the circuit courts.17 During the early 
years of the Republic, circuit riding took up nearly half of the 
Justices’ year, was undertaken at the Justices’ own expense, 
and was physically very onerous and at times even danger-
ous.18 Justice James Iredell, for example, died at the youthful 
age of forty-eight,19 in part because of the rigors of circuit rid-
ing in the southern circuit, where roads and accommodations 
were still quite scarce.20 
Jay’s complaints about circuit riding surfaced in 1790, 
right after the Justices’ very first season of riding circuit.21 Jay 
 
 15. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SU-
PREME COURT 11 (1928). 
 16. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333–34 (“[T]he attendance 
of only one of the justices of the supreme court, at the several circuit courts of 
the United States, to be hereafter held, shall be sufficient, any law requiring 
the attendance of two of the said justices notwithstanding . . . .”). 
 17. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79. Roughly, the ju-
risdiction of the district courts included certain criminal cases, as well as civil 
cases involving admiralty and maritime questions, id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77, 
while the circuit courts handled trials of cases involving diversity of citizen-
ship and appeals from the district courts, id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79. 
 18. See Maeva Marcus, Introduction to 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 12, at 1, 3. 
 19. See Robert M. Ireland, Iredell, James, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 509, 509 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d 
ed. 2005) [hereinafter OXFORD COMPANION]. 
 20. See id. (“The physically taxing duties of riding his federal judicial cir-
cuit contributed to his death . . . .”); Kermit L. Hall, Circuit Riding, in OXFORD 
COMPANION, supra note 19, at 169, 169 (“The southern circuit . . . required 
travel of nearly 1,800 miles, twice a year, in a country that had poor roads or, 
in some places, none at all.”); Glick, supra note 1, at 1765 (describing the ex-
perience of circuit riding on the southern circuit); see also id. at 1771 n.130 
(discussing the assignment of the Justices to specific circuits). 
 21. Jay’s diary entries from Massachusetts in late April 1790 reveal his 
struggle with a late and harsh winter storm, in which his “[h]orses [were] 
much incommoded by the Snow & wet.” Diary Entry of John Jay (Apr. 29, 
1790), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 54, 54. Compared to 
some of the other Justices, Jay had it easy on the eastern circuit, through 
which travel was “fatiguing,” but not nearly as arduous as travel through the 
southern circuit. See Glick, supra note 1, at 1765 (“‘[T]he Southern Circuit re-
quired long trips through rough, unpopulated, and even unknown terrain’ at 
times in ‘unpredictably bad nasty weather’ with lodgings ‘uncertain and often 
unpleasant.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wythe Holt, “The Federal Courts 
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drafted a letter to President Washington on behalf of his fellow 
Justices objecting to circuit riding on two constitutional 
grounds.22 First, he argued, allowing the Justices to hear cases 
in courts of original jurisdiction violated Article III, Section 223 
because of the “legal Incompatibility of ultimate appellate Ju-
risdiction, with original Jurisdiction.”24 In Jay’s view, it was 
undesirable for the Justices to hear appeals on cases they had 
tried originally in the circuit courts. Second, Jay argued, Con-
gress had violated Article II, Section 2 (the Appointments 
Clause)25 by essentially appointing the Justices to ride the cir-
cuit courts when this is “an Exercise of Powers, which, consti-
tutionally and exclusively belong to the President and Sen-
ate.”26 In other words, the Justices were nominated, confirmed, 
and commissioned to sit on the Supreme Court and not on the 
circuit courts. By appending onerous and nongermane inferior 
court duties onto the duties of a Supreme Court Justice, Jay be-
lieved that Congress had violated the Appointments Clause. 
Jay acknowledged that there was a distinction between the 
Supreme Court as an institution and its Justices. He thus did 
not think that circuit riding added impermissibly to the origi-
nal jurisdiction of the Court. Rather, he believed that the Su-
preme Court should not sit in judgment of its own members’ 
decisions on the inferior courts: 
  We are aware of the Distinction between a Court and it’s [sic] 
Judges; and are far from thinking it illegal or unconstitutional, how-
ever it may be inexpedient to employ them for other Purposes, pro-
vided the latter Purposes be consistent and compatible with the for-
mer_ [sic] But from this Distinction it cannot, in our Opinions, be 
inferred, that the Judges of the Supreme Court may also be Judges of 
inferior and subordinate Courts, and be at the same Time both the 
Controllers and the controled [sic].27 
 
 
Have Enemies in All Who Fear Their Influence on State Objects”: The Failure 
to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts of 1792 and 
1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 308 (1987))); see also id. at 1771 n.130 (discussing 
the assignment of the Justices to specific circuits). 
 22. See Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washing-
ton, supra note 12, at 89–91. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 24. See Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washing-
ton, supra note 12, at 89–90. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 26. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, 
supra note 12, at 91. 
 27. Id. at 90. 
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Jay feared that the public’s faith in the new Federal Su-
preme Court would be undermined every time the Justices af-
firmed the opinion of one of their own.28 He cited Matthew Ba-
con’s A New Abridgement of the Law to show that once 
appointed to the greater office of the Supreme Court, the Jus-
tices believed of their “inferior” duties on the lower courts that 
there was “‘a Presumption they cannot be executed with Impar-
tiality and Honesty.’”29 
Jay’s letter to Washington appears never to have been 
sent,30 and perhaps believing that they had overstated their 
case, the Justices did not push the issue further at that time.31 
Two years later, however, the Justices did ask the President 
and Congress for relief from “a kind of life, on which we cannot 
reflect, without experiencing sensations and emotions, more 
easy to conceive than proper for us to express.”32 Their request 
contained no explicit references to the constitutionality of cir-
cuit riding, but it did represent to Congress, framed as an issue 
of policy, the two main points from Jay’s aborted letter of 1790: 
[T]he distinction made between the Supreme Court and its Judges, 
and appointing the same men finally to correct in one capacity, the 
errors which they themselves may have committed in another, is a 
distinction unfriendly to impartial justice, and to that confidence in 
the supreme Court, which it is so essential to the public Interest 
should be reposed in it.33 
Many of the representations contained in the letter re-
ferred to the “too burthensome” task of riding circuit in be-
tween the two sessions of the Supreme Court and during “the 
two most severe seasons of the year.”34 For example, the Jus-
tices objected “[t]hat to require of the Judges to pass the 
greater part of their days on the road, and at Inns, and at a dis-
tance from their families, is a requisition which in their opinion 
should not be made unless in cases of necessity.”35 This com-
plaint about the onerous quality of circuit riding suggests that 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. (quoting 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE 
LAW 736–37 (London, E. Richardson & C. Lintot 2d ed. 1762)). 
 30. GOEBEL, supra note 13, at 556. 
 31. Cf. id. (noting that Jay was prepared to challenge the Judiciary Act, 
but did not do so “for reasons of political decorum”). 
 32. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington 
(Aug. 9, 1792), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 288, 288. 
 33. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to Congress (Aug. 9, 
1792), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 289, 290. 
 34. Id. at 289–90. 
 35. Id. at 290 (editor’s footnotes omitted). 
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had the going not been so arduous (especially during a time 
when the docket of the Supreme Court was quite slim36), no ob-
jections to circuit riding, constitutional or otherwise, might 
have been raised. Further evidence of this point is the fact that 
the Justices did not initially object to the constitutionality of 
circuit riding when it was first imposed on them in 1789, before 
they had learned from experience how hard it was. 
But the really interesting founding-era debate about the 
constitutionality of circuit riding did not arise until the period 
between 1801 and 1803, when John Adams’s Federalists 
squared off against the Jeffersonians over the issue. In the win-
ter of 1801, months after he had lost his bid for reelection, Ad-
ams persuaded Congress to abolish circuit riding and to create 
sixteen new circuit court judges, whom he got to pick, to staff 
the circuit courts.37 The Jeffersonians were outraged by the ap-
pointments of the so-called midnight judges.38 As a result, Con-
gress passed a Repeal Act in 1802, abolishing the new circuit 
court judgeships and reintroducing circuit riding by the Jus-
tices.39 This Repeal Act raised two constitutional questions: 
First, could Congress by ordinary legislation abolish life-
tenured federal judgeships? Second, was the re-creation by 
Congress of circuit riding constitutional?40 This second question 
touched off a heated debate on the Marshall Court, which re-
vealed that a number of the Justices in 1802, including Chief 
Justice John Marshall, thought that circuit riding was uncon-
stitutional as an original matter.41 Professor Bruce Ackerman 
 
 36. See Glick, supra note 1, at 1764 (citing, among other sources, BER-
NARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1993)) (“During [the 
first session of the Supreme Court] and the following two terms, there were no 
cases on the docket and the justices had little to do.” (footnote omitted)). 
 37. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90–91 (repealed 1802) 
(establishing the new circuit court judgeships); see also 1 CHARLES WARREN, 
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 185–88 (rev. ed. 1937) (de-
tailing the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1801). 
 38. WARREN, supra note 37, at 188–209. Charles Warren quotes a famous 
letter drafted by Thomas Jefferson in March 1801 that helped spawn the term 
“midnight judges,” in which Jefferson rails against the “‘new appointments 
which Mr. A[dams] crowded in with whip and spur from the 12th of Dec. when 
the event of the election was known . . . until 8 o’clock of the night at 12 o’clock 
of which he was to go out of office.’” Id. at 201 (omission in original). 
 39. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (repealed 1911). 
 40. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: 
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 176 
(2005). 
 41. Id. at 163–72. 
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demonstrates why the reestablishment of circuit riding was 
upheld by the Marshall Court: key Justices, such as William 
Paterson and Bushrod Washington, thought the issue had been 
settled by practice.42 Professor Ackerman claims the Justices 
who took that position did so mainly out of fear of the political 
power of the Jeffersonians, who were then riding high.43 
Several notable exchanges occurred on the Marshall Court 
during this time as to the constitutionality of circuit riding. 
Professor Ackerman describes Marshall’s opinion on the issue: 
  Only four of Marshall’s letters remain in the archives, but all take 
the same position. If the justices consulted first principles, the Consti-
tution gives them no choice—they must defy the new statutory com-
mand and refuse to go circuit riding. For Marshall, a simple point was 
decisive: when he and his colleagues obtained their appointments, 
they received commissions to serve as justices of the Supreme Court, 
and not as all-purpose providers of judicial services. The jurisdiction 
of Supreme Court justices is defined in Article III of the Constitution, 
and it does not include a grant to ride around the country holding tri-
als with district judges. Before Marshall and the others could be re-
quired to engage in extensive trial work, the president and Senate 
would have to appoint them to a second, distinct office. In the words 
of his letter to Justice Cushing on April 19[, 1802]: “For myself I more 
than doubt the constitutionality of this measure & of performing cir-
cuit duty without a commission as a circuit Judge.”44 
Professor Ackerman also quotes a letter from Marshall to 
Paterson, in which Marshall again expressed doubt as to the 
constitutionality of circuit riding:  
I cannot conquer [the opinion] that the constitution requires distinct 
appointments & commissions for the Judges of the inferior courts 
from those of the supreme court. It is however my duty & my inclina-
tion in this as in all other cases to be bound by the opinion of the ma-
jority of the Judges.45 
 
 42. Id. at 165–66 (noting that Paterson’s opinion on the constitutionality 
of circuit riding “not only is important in itself but will affect the decisions of 
the others”); id. at 169–70 (describing the opinions of Paterson and Washing-
ton). 
 43. Id. at 170–72. 
 44. Id. at 163–64 (quoting Letter from John Marshall to William Cushing 
(Apr. 19, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 108, 108 (Charles F. 
Hobson ed., 1990) [hereinafter 6 MARSHALL PAPERS]). 
 45. Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (Apr. 19, 1802), quoted 
in ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 165. Marshall also declared his willingness to 
be bound by majority opinion in his letter to Cushing of April 19, 1802: 
For myself I more than doubt the constitutionality of . . . performing 
circuit duty without a commission as a circuit Judge. But I shall hold 
myself bound by the opinions of my brothers. I am not of opinion that 
we can under our present appointments hold circuit courts, but I pre-
sume a contrary opinion is held by the court & if so I shall conform to 
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Nor was Marshall alone in thinking that the Repeal Act 
was unconstitutional in so far as it restored circuit riding. Jus-
tice Samuel Chase likewise argued against the constitutionality 
of circuit riding in a letter to Marshall.46 Chase also raised the 
separate proposition in this letter that it would be unconstitu-
tional for the Justices to return to ride circuit and displace the 
circuit court judges appointed by Adams in 1801.47 Chase laid 
out at length his objections to the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 
1801 and the impending bill that would reestablish the Jus-
tices’ riding circuit: 
If the repealing Law has not abolished the Circuit Courts, which it 
certainly has not done, but has established Circuit Courts in the re-
pealing Act, and also in the Bill intended to be passed, substantially 
the same with the Circuit Courts in the Law repealed; and if the re-
pealing Act has not destroyed the Office of the Judges appointed, 
commissioned, and qualified under the Law repealed; it follows that 
the Offices of these Judges are now full; and consequently no Judge of 
the Supreme Court (nor any Judge of any District Court) holding this 
opinion can exercise the Office of a Judge of such Courts, without vio-
lating the Constitution. Secondly—If the repealing Act be void, so far, 
as it intends to destroy the Office of the Judges under the Law re-
pealed, and a Judge of the Supreme Court (or of a District Court) 
should hold the Circuit Court, I think he would, thereby, be instru-
mental to carry into effect an unconstitutional Law. If he executes the 
Office of Circuit Judge, I think he thereby decides that the repealing 
was constitutional.48 
In addition to attacking the legitimacy of the Justices’ rid-
ing circuit under the Repeal Act, Chase also stated his belief 
that even if they had been given specific commissions as judges 
of the inferior courts—which he believed they lacked—the Jus-
tices would remain constitutionally precluded from hearing 
cases of first instance for wont of a specific grant of original ju-
risdiction to do so: 
  I am inclined to believe, that a Judge of the Supreme Court cannot 
act as a Judge of a Circuit Court, without, or with a commission. No 
one can deny that a Judge of the Circuit Court is an Officer of the 
United States; and the Constitution . . . directs the President to com-
mission all the Officers of the United States. I apprehend that, no one 
can hold any Office under the United States, without a Commission to 
hold such office. 
 
it. 
Letter from John Marshall to William Cushing, supra note 44, at 108. 
 46. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 MAR-
SHALL PAPERS, supra note 44, at 109, 113–15. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. at 113–14. 
CALABRESI & PRESSER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:09:57 AM 
2006] REINTRODUCING CIRCUIT RIDING 1397 
 
  . . . The Constitution intended that the Judges of the Supreme 
Court should not have original Jurisdiction, but only in the few Cases 
enumerated. The inference is just, that, as the Constitution only gave 
the supreme Court original Jurisdiction in a few specified cases, it in-
tended to exclude them from original Jurisdiction in all other cases; 
and more especially as it gives them appellate Jurisdiction in all 
Cases that should arise under the Constitution or Laws of the United 
states. But the Judges have held Circuit Courts ever since the forma-
tion of the Federal Government, until the late Judiciary Law [of Feb-
ruary 13, 1801]. The fact is so. I can truly say that I never considered 
the question. I acted as a Circuit Judge . . . . By the Constitution . . . , 
all Judges are to be nominated by the President to the senate, and the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, is to appoint 
them. If Congress, by Law, requires a Judge of the supreme Court to 
hold a Circuit Court, does not Congress, thereby, substantially nomi-
nate and appoint a Judge of the Circuit Court?49 
Despite his strong feelings on the subject, however, Chase’s col-
leagues persuaded him to go back to circuit riding, and he thus 
became “instrumental to carry into effect”50 the Repeal Act. 
As Professor Ackerman discusses, three of the Justices 
polled by Marshall—Washington, Paterson, and William Cush-
ing—argued that the constitutionality of circuit riding had been 
settled by early practice.51 Contemporaneous letters reveal the 
opinion of several of the Justices that, in the words of one re-
cent commentator, “since the original justices had acquiesced to 
performing their circuit-riding duties, the question of constitu-
tionality should be regarded as settled.”52  
It was this sentiment that carried the day when, in Stuart 
v. Laird,53 the issue of the constitutionality of circuit riding and 
of the Repeal Act of 1802 finally reached the Supreme Court. 
Having already sat on the case as a circuit Justice, Marshall 
recused himself from the appeal,54 as was the unofficial prac-
 
 49. Id. at 114–15. 
 50. Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted). 
 51. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 169–70. 
 52. Glick, supra note 1, at 1791 (citing Letter from Hannah Cushing to 
Abigail Adams (June 25, 1802), quoted in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 44, 
at 118 n.6 (editor’s footnote) (revealing Paterson’s views by including a portion 
of a letter from Paterson to Marshall and copied to Cushing); Letter from John 
Marshall to William Paterson (May 3, 1802), in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra 
note 44, at 117, 117–18 (revealing Washington’s views); Letters from William 
Paterson to John Marshall (June 11 & 18, 1802), cited in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, 
supra note 44, at 118 n.6 (editor’s footnote) (reporting Cushing’s views)). 
Paterson’s views as expressed in his correspondence foreshadowed his holding 
in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
 53. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299. 
 54. Id. at 308. 
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tice by the Justices when cases they had heard on circuit came 
before the Court.55 Stuart’s lawyer, Charles Lee, was the for-
mer Attorney General under Adams56 and “an experienced Vir-
ginia practitioner.”57 Lee offered three main points against the 
circuit court’s, and the Supreme Court’s, jurisdiction to hear 
the case, which were reminiscent of Jay’s, Marshall’s, and 
Chase’s beliefs concerning the constitutionality of circuit rid-
ing.58 First, Lee argued that the Repeal Act, which created the 
circuit court and bestowed jurisdiction upon it, unconstitution-
ally deprived all the previously existing federal courts of their 
jurisdiction and stripped the circuit judges of their life-tenured 
offices granted by the Judiciary Act of 1801.59 Second, Lee 
claimed that the Repeal Act and the Act of April 29, 1802,60 
were unconstitutional “because they impose new duties upon 
the judges of the supreme court, and thereby infringe their in-
dependence; and because they are a legislative instead of an 
 
 55. See, e.g., Fenemore v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 357, 364 (1797) 
(Paterson, J.) (“As I joined in giving the judgment of the circuit court, it gives 
me pleasure to be relieved from the necessity of delivering any opinion on the 
present occasion.”); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19, 42 (1795) (Cushing, 
J.) (recusing himself from rendering an opinion “upon the question of affirm-
ing or reversing the judgment of the court below,” on which he sat). But see, 
e.g., Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 108–16 (1795) (Blair, J.) 
(reiterating his reasoning on the circuit court but admitting that after hearing 
the opinions of his brethren on the Supreme Court, he is “of a different opin-
ion” regarding his allocation of damages); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 402, 405–06 (1792) (Iredell, J.) (indicating that though he had heard the 
case at circuit court, he gave “[his] opinion, on the present motion, detached 
from every previous consideration of the merits of the cause”). 
 56. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Charles Lee, in ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1789–1985, at 6, 6 (1985).  
 57. GOEBEL, supra note 13, at 582. Only four years earlier, Lee, acting as 
Attorney General, had successfully argued before the Court that the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution “supercede[d] all suits depending as well as 
prevent[ed] the institution of new suits against a state by citizens of another 
state” in federal court, maintaining that “[f ]rom the moment those who gave 
the power to sue a state annulled it, this power ceased to be a part of the Con-
stitution, and if it did not exist there, it could not be exercised.” Id. at 740–41. 
Lee also argued on behalf of William Marbury in the contemporaneous and 
hugely significant case Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), 
where, as a Federalist, he likely expected to encounter a sympathetic Court. 
Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. 
REV. 729, 743–44 (2005). Lee was to be disappointed by the outcomes of both 
cases, whose opinions were handed down within a week of each other. 
 58. See supra notes 22–29, 44–49 and accompanying text. 
 59. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 303–05 (argument by Lee). 
 60. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156. 
CALABRESI & PRESSER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:09:57 AM 
2006] REINTRODUCING CIRCUIT RIDING 1399 
 
executive appointment of judges to certain courts.”61 Finally, 
Lee asserted that “[a] party in [the Supreme Court] has a right 
to have his cause tried by [all six unbiased Justices]” and that 
“[a Justice] having tried the cause in the court below, and given 
judgment, must be in some measure committed; he feels an 
anxiety that his judgment should be affirmed.”62 
In four paragraphs drafted by Justice Paterson, which did 
not specifically address the merits of most of Lee’s argument, 
the Court held the Repeal Act and the practice of Justices rid-
ing circuit—already acquiesced to by the Marshall Court63—to 
be constitutional.64 Paterson reiterated the reliance on custom 
in explaining the Court’s reasoning: 
Another [proposed] reason for reversal is, that the judges of the su-
preme court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed 
as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct commis-
sions for that purpose. To this objection, which is of recent date, it is 
sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a pe-
riod of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial 
system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the con-
struction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible na-
ture. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be 
shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not 
now to be disturbed.65 
This was the last time that the Court considered the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of circuit riding.66 When Congress 
 
 61. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 305. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The Justices had resumed riding circuit in the fall of 1802, “sig-
nif[ying] their acquiescence in the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and in 
the restoration of the former system.” 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 44, at 
121 n.1 (editor’s footnote). 
 64. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 308–09; cf. David R. Stras & Ryan W. 
Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1397, 1408 (2006) (calling Stuart “abysmally reasoned,” but concurring in 
the result on the grounds that “Congress may add to a judge’s responsibilities, 
subject only to the requirement of reappointment for duties wholly nonger-
mane to the office”). 
 65. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 309. 
 66. After the Stuart decision, the fate of circuit riding rested with Con-
gress, which engaged in a century-long volley from House to House of numer-
ous bills, only a few of which became acts, that attempted to address the needs 
of the judiciary as expansion and industrial revolution bequeathed upon the 
nation’s courts rapidly bourgeoning dockets at both the nisi prius and appel-
late levels. See generally FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 30–145. 
However, the rationale on which it was upheld—that the acquiescence of the 
Justices and decades of tradition had rendered the question moot as a matter 
of constitutional construction—has since been questioned in other contexts by 
other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 
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finally did away with circuit riding in 1911, it did so not on any 
constitutional basis, but for pragmatic reasons: it adopted the 
current system of federal appellate courts and gave the Su-
preme Court the power of certiorari in order to gain control 
over the ballooning dockets of the federal courts.67 Stuart68 thus 
remains the final word from the Court on the constitutionality 
of circuit riding; and, indeed, the current practice of allowing 
Justices and circuit court judges to sit by designation on infe-
rior federal courts69 presupposes the constitutionality of circuit 
riding. The fact that many Justices, both retired and active, in 
recent years have sat by designation on the inferior federal 
courts70 shows that Stuart is still good law to the extent it holds 
that Justices may sit on the inferior courts even though they 
are commissioned only to the Supreme Court. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OUR CIRCUIT-RIDING 
PROPOSAL UNDER CURRENT APPOINTMENTS 
CLAUSE PRECEDENT 
Whether or not circuit riding was constitutional as prac-
ticed in the early days of the Republic, and regardless of its 
constitutionality as a matter of originalism, circuit riding as we 
propose to re-create it today would be constitutional. Chief Jus-
tice John Jay acknowledged that other judicial duties could be 
assigned to Justices, provided that the purposes of their extra–
Supreme Court duties were “consistent and compatible” with 
their role on the Court.71 We believe that Justices riding circuit 
 
1983) (“This early line of Supreme Court authority, holding that unchallenged 
historical practice is sufficient evidence of constitutionality, no longer . . . 
represents the thinking of the Court. Recent Supreme Court discussions of the 
issue indicate that any practice, no matter how fully accepted or efficient, is 
‘subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and . . . sets 
out just how those powers are to be exercised.’” (second omission in original) 
(quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983))), withdrawn, 732 F.2d 111 
(9th Cir. 1984). 
 67. See discussion infra notes 112–23 and accompanying text. 
 68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299. 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 43(b) (2000) (providing that Justices “designated or as-
signed [to a circuit court of appeals] shall be competent to sit as judges of the 
court”); id. § 291(b) (allowing circuit judges to serve on district courts); id. 
§ 294(a) (permitting retired Justices to sit by designation). 
 70. See, e.g., Redden v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 956 F.2d 302 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, sitting by designation on a 
three-judge appellate panel); Rice v. Branigar Org., Inc., 922 F.2d 788 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (opinion by retired Justice Lewis Powell, sitting by designation).  
 71. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, 
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for four weeks a year during the Court’s three-month summer 
recess would not interfere with their duties on the Court. Nor 
would it significantly impinge on their quality of life as hap-
pened to the Justices in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. Relatively recently, then-Associate Justice 
William Rehnquist sat by designation as a trial judge in the 
Fourth Circuit without experiencing any of the horribles inti-
mated by the early foes of circuit riding.72 Our proposal entails 
a limited amount of circuit riding, encourages the Justices’ 
recusal from hearing appeals of their own lower court deci-
sions—which has, at any rate, not been a problem with Justices 
sitting by designation on circuit courts of appeals—and asks 
the Justices to perform duties that are entirely germane to 
their duties as Justices. 
As one of us has discussed in another recent article, the 
key issue as to the constitutionality of circuit riding is whether 
it violates the Appointments Clause by annexing the duties of a 
separate and new office to the existing duties of a Supreme 
Court Justice.73 The Rehnquist Court clearly held in Weiss v. 
United States that Congress may annex additional duties to an 
existing office provided that those additional duties are ger-
mane to the duties of the existing office. Weiss required the 
Court to consider whether judge advocates general could ap-
point commissioned officers of the armed services to serve as 
military judges without a separate nomination by the President 
and confirmation by the Senate.74 The Court quite correctly 
concluded that history and practice had settled the issue.75 Be-
cause “the role of military judge is ‘germane’ to that of military 
officer,” no separate nomination and confirmation process was 
constitutionally required.76 
The issue, then, with respect to the constitutionality of our 
circuit-riding proposal is whether requiring Justices to spend 
 
supra note 12, at 90. 
 72. See John A. Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk with Justice Rehnquist, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 (“Last year, [Rehnquist] trav-
eled unannounced to Richmond, Va., to preside over a two-day trial . . . . ‘To 
refresh myself,’ he explains.”). 
 73. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 4, at 859–68; see also Steven G. 
Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES 15, 82–89 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006). 
 74. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 170 (1994). 
 75. Id. at 174–76. 
 76. Id. at 176. 
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four weeks a year sitting by designation as trial judges attaches 
a nongermane duty to the office of Supreme Court Justice. We 
think it does not. First, as we have already explained in Part I, 
more than 200 years ago in Stuart v. Laird, a far more onerous 
form of circuit riding—involving months and months of arduous 
and physically dangerous labor—was held to be perfectly con-
stitutional by the Marshall Court.77 After 200 years, it is ar-
guably far too late in the day to revisit the question of the con-
stitutionality of circuit riding, especially when the Marshall 
Court thought that question was foreclosed by 12 years of early 
practice, and when circuit riding went on for 122 years of the 
nation’s constitutional history.78 If Stuart is not to be overruled, 
then surely our modest circuit-riding plan must be upheld. And 
it seems awfully late in our history for a 200-year-old founda-
tional case like Stuart to be overruled. 
Second, in reliance on the correctness of Stuart, many re-
tired Justices have sat by designation on the inferior federal 
courts.79 If Stuart were overruled, one would have to conclude 
that it is unconstitutional for retired Supreme Court Justices to 
sit by designation on the inferior federal courts. A retired Su-
preme Court Justice is, after all, only commissioned to sit on 
the Supreme Court, and so if mandatory circuit riding violates 
the Appointments Clause voluntary sitting by designation must 
violate it as well. The long-standing practice of retired Justices 
sitting by designation on the inferior courts, along with the 
122-year practice of circuit riding, suggest that our circuit-
riding plan is perfectly constitutional. 
Third, under Weiss, the duty of sitting for four weeks as a 
trial judge is germane to the job of being a Supreme Court Jus-
 
 77. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
 78. The era of circuit riding began with the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 
Stat. 73, and was not formally abolished until 1911 by the Judicial Code of 
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167 (abolishing the existing circuit 
courts). The Code took effect on January 1, 1912, and finally eliminated the 
circuit courts, FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 134, though a whiff 
of them remained in that circuit court of appeals judges could hold district 
court, id. at 135. 
 79. See, e.g., Rice v. Branigar Org., Inc., 922 F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(opinion by retired Justice Lewis Powell, sitting by designation); see also 28 
U.S.C.S. § 294 interpretive notes and decs. (LexisNexis 2001) (Generally) (“In-
herent power of justices of the Supreme Court to preside over trial courts has 
long been taken as matter [sic] of course, and retired justice [sic] retains his 
office, all judicial power with respect to such duties, as he would have pos-
sessed had he not retired.”). 
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tice.80 Justices control the content of our law of criminal proce-
dure and promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Criminal Procedure, and Evidence.81 It is important for them to 
experience first hand the problems our nation’s trial courts face 
so the Justices can do a better job in writing the rules that gov-
ern those courts. 
Moreover, the duty imposed is not an onerous one. Justices 
currently work only nine months a year, on a docket that is 
about half what it was fifteen years ago, and with twice as 
many law clerks as they had in 1968.82 Asking them to spend 
four weeks of their three-month summer vacation among infe-
rior court judges rather than in lecturing with European and 
American legal elites is not unreasonably burdensome. Mem-
bers of Congress travel back to their home districts on a weekly 
basis, and the President and Vice President travel throughout 
the United States all the time. Asking Justices to spend a mere 
four weeks a year in the circuits to which they are assigned as 
circuit Justices is not an onerous or unreasonable demand. 
Learning what judges think of Supreme Court doctrine outside 
the world of the Beltway, the elite national law schools, and 
European legal elites is germane to the job of being a Justice. 
Under the test of Weiss,83 therefore, our circuit-riding plan 
ought to be upheld. 
A skeptic might ask at this point whether a more onerous 
form of circuit riding than the one we propose would also be 
constitutional. What if Congress were really to go back to the 
good old days and require the Justices to spend six months of 
the year riding circuit? What if Congress were to require that 
the Justices travel on horseback or by bus and not by plane? 
We think such a burdensome plan might well impair the inde-
pendence of the Court by requiring the Justices to perform 
nongermane duties. Because the germaneness test is inher-
ently one of reasonableness, we think Congress can impose rea-
sonable lower court duties on the Justices but not unreasonable 
ones. Moreover, the test of what is reasonable must be in terms 
 
 80. Cf. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 173–76 (discussing germaneness in the context 
of the military justice system and concluding that “the role of military judge is 
‘germane’ to that of military officer”). 
 81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (granting the Court the power to make 
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence). 
 82. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND RE-
FORM 139 (1996); Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 73, at 34–35. 
 83. See 510 U.S. at 173–76. 
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of what is reasonable in the twenty-first century, in a world 
with plane travel and a nation of nearly 300 million citizens. 
Just because onerous circuit riding was constitutional and rea-
sonable early in our constitutional history does not necessarily 
mean that it would be so today. We think it extremely unlikely 
that Congress would impose unreasonable circuit-riding duties 
on the current Justices—but were Congress to do so, the Jus-
tices would be within their rights to strike down such a law. We 
do not think a hypothetical and far-fetched parade of horribles 
should preclude adoption of our modest circuit-riding plan, 
which, as we show in Part IV below, has several practical bene-
fits. 
III.  THE ARGUMENTS FOR ABOLISHING THE ORIGINAL 
CIRCUIT-RIDING SYSTEM DO NOT APPLY TO OUR 
PROPOSAL TO REVIVE CIRCUIT RIDING 
Circuit riding as it was officially practiced from 1790 until 
1911 failed to work, but for reasons that ought not to prevent 
its re-creation in the modest form we propose here. The biggest 
objection to circuit riding made early in our constitutional his-
tory stemmed from the fact that travel in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries could be difficult, time consum-
ing, and life threatening.84 In his recent history of circuit rid-
ing, Joshua Glick notes many instances illustrating the ex-
treme physical hardship it imposed on the Justices.85 A brief 
smattering of examples reveals that the Justices had to contend 
with flashfloods washing out bridges and nearly killing them 
(James Iredell);86 lodging in public houses with as many as 
twelve strangers in the same room (William Cushing)87 and 
sometimes “‘a bed fellow of the wrong sort’” (Iredell);88 untried 
routes and modes of transportation over great distances and 
 
 84. See, e.g., Glick, supra note 1, at 1765–82, 1801–17; see also supra 
notes 18–21 and accompanying text. For a concise overview of the history of 
circuit riding and major changes to the circuit courts throughout their exis-
tence, see Glick, supra note 1. For a detailed history of the challenges facing 
the circuit courts during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, along with 
Congress’s attempts to deal with them, see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra 
note 15, at 4–145. 
 85. See Glick, supra note 1, at 1765–66. 
 86. Id. at 1765 n.78. 
 87. Id. at 1765 n.79. 
 88. Id. (quoting Marcus, supra note 18, at 3). 
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through unfamiliar territory (Samuel Chase);89 and such hard-
ships as distance and weather that “incommoded [horses] by 
the Snow & wet” (John Jay).90 Such pitfalls rendered the cir-
cuit-riding Justices’ absences from their homes and families 
particularly unpleasant.91 
Between 1790 and 1802, the United States was divided 
into three circuits: an eastern, a middle, and a southern cir-
cuit.92 Travel through the southern circuit was especially diffi-
cult.93 There were few roads, and those that existed were some-
times washed out. The only means of travel was on horseback 
or by stagecoach, and accommodations could be hard to find.94 
Much of the circuit was sparsely settled frontier territory. In 
short, circuit riding was a physically arduous task, especially 
for aging Supreme Court Justices.95 The physical rigors of cir-
cuit riding appear to have contributed to the death of Justice 
Iredell, one of the most distinguished of the early Justices, at 
the age of forty-eight.96 In addition to imposing these physical 
hardships, the practice demanded prolonged absences of the 
Justices from their families97 at a time when telephone or tele-
graph communication was nonexistent.  
None of these difficulties would be present today. Today’s 
Justices would be away from their families for only four weeks 
in July, a time of year when they might even be able to bring 
their families with them as they sat on circuit. Travel would be 
by jet plane, not on horseback, and Congress ought to provide a 
comfortable enough budget to pay for reasonable hotel accom-
modations. Thanks to telephones, cable television, and the 
Internet, Justices would not be isolated for months on end from 
 
 89. See id. at 1766 n.80 (describing Chase’s trip from Baltimore to Savan-
nah). 
 90. Diary Entry of John Jay, supra note 21, at 54. 
 91. Early on in the practice of circuit riding, the Justices objected “[t]hat 
to require of the Judges to pass the greater part of their days on the road . . . 
and at a distance from their families, is a requisition which in their opinion 
should not be made unless in cases of necessity.” Letter from the Justices of 
the Supreme Court to Congress, supra note 33, at 290 (editor’s footnotes omit-
ted). 
 92. The three-circuit system laid out in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 
§ 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75, was not augmented to compose six circuits until after 
the Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157–58, took effect. 
 93. See discussion supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 94. See generally supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 95. Glick, supra note 1, at 1766. 
 96. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 97. Glick, supra note 1, at 1766. 
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family, friends, co-workers, or news sources. Moreover, their 
circuit-riding duties would take up only four weeks of the year 
and not several months. Fifty- and sixty-year-old Justices 
ought not to find four weeks a year of trial work to be too physi-
cally taxing or onerous. Perhaps such work would be hard for 
an eighty-five-year-old Justice like John Paul Stevens, but we 
believe, respectfully, that such elderly Justices ought to retire. 
Thus, the first historical argument against circuit riding no 
longer applies. 
A second set of initial arguments against circuit riding was 
made in 1790 by Attorney General Edmund Randolph.98 Ac-
cording to Felix Frankfurter and James Landis these argu-
ments “have never been stated more impressively nor more 
pithily than in Randolph’s report.”99 Randolph made several in-
terrelated claims. He worried that if they were too busy riding 
circuit, the Justices would lack the time and leisure they 
needed to become “master[s] of the common law in all its divi-
sions, . . . chancellor[s], . . . civilian[s], . . . federal jurist[s], and 
skilled in the laws of each State.”100 This concern obviously is 
not raised by our circuit-riding proposal. Spending four weeks 
in July riding circuit rather than hobnobbing with European or 
American legal elites would not make the Justices any less 
learned in the law. To the contrary, riding circuit would give 
the Justices real experience with trial work and with questions 
of state law that would make them better jurists. Modern day 
Justices have a huge staff of law clerks and librarians to assist 
them and far more complete briefing than did their predeces-
sors in the 1790s.101 Four weeks of trial work a year would not 
deprive the Justices of the leisure time they need to serve effec-
tively on the Supreme Court. 
Randolph also objected to the problem of bias raised by the 
early form of circuit riding, both because initially two Justices 
rode circuit together102 and because those two were then among 
 
 98. See Edmund Randolph, Report of the Attorney General to the House 
of Representatives (Dec. 27, 1790) [hereinafter Randolph Report], in AM. STATE 
PAPERS: 1 MISCELLANEOUS 23 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 
1834). 
 99. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 15. 
 100. Randolph Report, supra note 98, at 23. 
 101. See 22 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 401.04 (3d ed. 2005) (describing the roles of the Court’s large staff, including 
librarians and law clerks); id. §§ 408.70–.75 (summarizing the Court’s re-
quirements for petitions for certiorari and briefing). 
 102. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75. 
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the six Justices who heard any appeal from a circuit court deci-
sion103 at a time when the Court’s jurisdiction was entirely 
mandatory.104 This objection likewise does not apply to our pro-
posal. We would have each Justice ride circuit alone on the fed-
eral trial courts within their respective circuits. Most of their 
decisions as trial judges would never be appealed, and, of those 
few decisions that would be appealed, in only a handful of cases 
would certiorari be sought from the Court. In only an even 
smaller handful of that handful, perhaps 1 percent,105 would 
certiorari be granted and the case heard by the Court. In those 
very few cases, the Justice whose lower court work was being 
reviewed ought to recuse himself, leaving the case to be decided 
by eight other engaged and active colleagues. We think this 
would more than suffice to take care of the problems with bias 
that Randolph raised in 1790 against the first circuit-riding 
law. 
Finally, and most quaintly, Randolph worried that circuit-
riding Justices might be forced to decide cases without ade-
quate guidance from experience, precedent, or books of refer-
ence: 
Situated as the United States are, many of the most weighty judiciary 
questions will be perfectly novel. These must be hurried off on the cir-
cuits, where necessary books are not to be had; or relinquished for ar-
gument before the next set of judges, who, on their part, may want 
books, and a calmer season for thought. So that a cause may be sus-
pended until every judge shall have heard it.106 
This is not a concern that would apply to any Justice riding 
circuit in the modern era. There are few novel legal questions 
facing most federal district courts, and books are to be had for 
study at any district or circuit court of appeals courthouse. 
 
 103. See Randolph Report, supra note 98, at 24. 
 104. It would be 100 years until the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, 
ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, first gave the Court discretion over its docket. The Act, 
discussed infra note 122 and accompanying text, “provided for direct appeals 
from the district and circuit courts to the Supreme Court in defined classes of 
cases [with intrinsically more important issues], and routed all other cases to 
the courts of appeals for final disposition [subject to certiorari by the Supreme 
Court].” FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 99 & n.195. 
 105. During the Court’s 2003 Term, 7,814 cases were filed, of which “91 . . . 
were argued and 89 were disposed of in 73 signed opinions.” CHIEF JUSTICE 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
9 (2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 
2004year-endreport.pdf. In other words, the Court granted certiorari to ap-
proximately 1.2 percent of the cases filed. 
 106. Randolph Report, supra note 98, at 24. 
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Moreover, today we have Internet access to the whole of the na-
tion’s federal and state case law, statutes, reports, and virtually 
every other public legal and historical document, which makes 
vast stores of knowledge available to any puzzled Justice. 
Randolph’s concerns were reasonable ones in 1790, and they 
even remained legitimate throughout much of the nineteenth 
century. Modern conditions, however, render these concerns 
moot. 
One related fear that critics of our proposal might raise is 
that Justices lack the competence to serve as federal trial court 
judges because the skills that make one a good appellate judge 
are so different from the skills required of a trial judge. We 
would respond to this point with several observations. First, for 
122 years of our history, famous Justices from John Marshall to 
Stephen Field rode circuit and tried cases.107 While law has be-
come more specialized since circuit riding was finally and for-
mally abolished in 1911,108 most of the modern Justices were at 
some point litigators,109 so they will mostly not be strangers to 
a trial courtroom. More importantly, we think Justices ought to 
know more about how trial courts actually work and about 
what is happening on the front lines of our court system, even if 
that requires that they learn something new. Instead of learn-
ing foreign constitutional law with European legal elites, we 
think they should be learning what problems are being created 
in the district and appellate courts of their own circuits by the 
Federal Rules the Justices promulgate110 and their own crimi-
nal procedure case law.111 Admittedly, some of the Justices may 
initially be reversed quite often in their trial court rulings, but 
that could be a good experience for them. They would eventu-
ally learn how to try cases, just as newly appointed district 
court judges must do. It is our impression that Supreme Court  
 
 
 107. See Glick, supra note 1, at 1793, 1813 (discussing the travels of the 
two Justices). 
 108. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. 
 109. For biographical information on the current Justices, see The Justices 
of the Supreme Court, supra note 8. 
 110. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (bestowing on the Court the power to es-
tablish rules of practice, procedure, and evidence).  
 111. Cf. Panel Four, supra note 1, at 643–44 (comments of Professor Amar) 
(“Because I actually think [the Justices have] been over-exuberant in criminal 
procedure, I would like them to actually see crime up close, in trials, and not 
just federal trials for white-collar crimes but murder, rape, and robbery cases 
as well.”). 
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Justices are brighter and more talented than many newly ap-
pointed district judges who may have been appointed, in part, 
because they were the friends of senators. We are therefore un-
persuaded by the argument that Justices are too incompetent 
to learn how to function successfully as trial judges for four 
weeks a year. 
A third major reason why circuit riding was abolished was 
that the dockets on both the circuit courts and the Supreme 
Court grew so out of control that the old circuit-riding system 
just completely broke down. Basically, circuit riding contem-
plated a three-tier federal court system—the Supreme Court, 
the circuit courts, and the district courts—staffed by only two 
tiers of judges—Supreme Court Justices and district judges.112 
The following data, reported by Frankfurter and Landis,113 
demonstrate why this system collapsed. 
Term Number of Cases Pending in the 




Obviously, there was no way the old system of circuit rid-
ing could by itself be reformed to handle an increase of such 
magnitude in the caseload of the federal judiciary. The only 
possible solution was the creation of a third tier of judges—the 
circuit judges—who could staff the circuit courts and make cir-
cuit riding unnecessary. That system is, of course, precisely 
what Congress chose to create, and today we have a federal ju-
diciary containing 91 district courts114 with 663 district 
judges.115 The districts are organized into 13 circuits,116 with a 
circuit court of appeals for each117 and to which at least 1 Jus-
tice is assigned as circuit Justice.118 The Justices oversee a to-
 
 112. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 113. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 60. 
 114. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81–131 (2000) (establishing and defining the federal 
district courts). This figure excludes the territorial courts for Guam, the Virgin 
Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (Supp. III 2003). 
 116. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000). 
 117. Id. § 43(a). 
 118. See id. § 42; Supreme Court Order of Wednesday, September 7, 2005, 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/090705pzr.pdf. 
CALABRESI & PRESSER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:09:57 AM 
1410 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1386 
 
tal of 179 judges sitting on the circuit courts of appeals.119 
The key mistake of the original system of circuit riding, 
which caused that system eventually to fail and become out-
dated, was its reliance on Supreme Court Justice manpower to 
do appreciable quantities of lower court work. That is simply 
not feasible in the modern world and has not been feasible for 
more than a century. But while circuit-riding Justices would 
not have any impact on the docket congestion of the district 
courts, we still think circuit riding is a good idea for other rea-
sons that we discuss in Part IV. We thus recommend that if cir-
cuit riding is re-created, it should be done not to get more work 
out of the Justices but instead to get them in touch with the 
problems of the district courts and with public opinion outside 
the Beltway and other elite circles. We would emphasize that 
our goal here would be to make the Justices better Justices. We 
have no desire to reintroduce circuit riding to “punish” the Jus-
tices, and we would strongly oppose any reinstitution of circuit 
riding that was proposed for such a purpose. 
There was a second docket congestion problem that caused 
the original system of circuit riding to break down: docket con-
gestion on the Supreme Court, which had at the time an en-
tirely mandatory jurisdiction.120 Again, data from Frankfurter 
and Landis121 illustrate the extent of the problem. 
 
 119. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000). The following table describes the distri-
bution of judges among the circuits. 
Circuits Number of Judges 














 120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 121. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 60. 
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Term Number of Cases on the  




The Court’s docket nearly tripled in the twenty years between 
1870 and 1890, a time when the Court had no discretion to re-
fuse to hear any of these cases! It was only natural that circuit 
riding could not work under these circumstances. The Justices 
could not even keep up with their own caseload, much less staff 
another tier of the federal judiciary. This is why when Congress 
passed the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891,122 the effect, 
according to Frankfurter and Landis, was instantaneous: “The 
Supreme Court at once felt its benefits. A flood of litigation had 
indeed been shut off.”123 
Obviously, today’s Supreme Court has an almost entirely 
discretionary docket,124 and while the Court is routinely asked 
to hear thousands of cases, in recent times it has chosen only to 
hear about eighty to ninety cases a year.125 In fact, the Justices 
only hear about half as many cases today as they did fifteen 
years ago.126 Moreover, they each have four law clerks to help 
them with their work, whereas they each only had two prior to 
 
 122. Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
 123. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 101. This statement is 
borne out by a glance at the number of cases on the Court’s appellate docket 
from 1887 to 1892. 
October 
Term 
Number of New Cases on the  







Id. at 102 & n.208. 
 124. See, e.g., MOORE ET AL., supra note 101, §§ 400.05[2], 405.02; Robert L. 
Stern et al., Epitaph for Mandatory Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 66 
(discussing the 1988 legislation relieving the Court almost entirely of its man-
datory appellate jurisdiction); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 125. For example, ninety-one cases were argued before the Court in the 
2003 Term, up from eighty-four in the 2002 Term. REHNQUIST, supra note 
105, at 9. 
 126. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 73, at 35. 
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1970.127 We do not mean to suggest that Supreme Court Jus-
tices and law clerks do not work hard: they mostly work very 
hard for nine months of the year. The other three months, how-
ever, are spent on a lengthy summer vacation that compares to 
that of schoolchildren.128 Moreover, that vacation is often spent 
in the company of European elites whom we think are a bad in-
fluence on the Justices, in part because they represent a deca-
dent, secular way of life. All we propose is that the Justices 
spend four of their twelve weeks off outside the Beltway on the 
judicial front lines of the nation. This is not an unreasonably 
onerous burden to impose. 
In sum, the original system of circuit riding was criticized 
and ultimately abolished because it was physically dangerous 
and exhausting, it deprived Justices of the time they needed to 
become experts in the law, it was awkward for Justices to hear 
appeals from cases they had tried below, the Justices had in-
adequate access to legal resources, there was a need for a third 
tier of federal circuit judges, and the Supreme Court’s caseload 
had grown completely unmanageable. Strikingly, none of these 
arguments continues to apply today. The arguments that led to 
the abolition of the original system of circuit riding do not 
counsel against the modest restoration we propose here. 
IV.  NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF 
REINTRODUCING CIRCUIT RIDING 
As we have been arguing throughout this Essay, we think 
reintroducing circuit riding is a good idea for three reasons. 
First, it would get the Justices back in touch with American 
values outside the Beltway, much as Presidents and members 
of Congress keep themselves acquainted with the public 
through their extensive domestic travels. Second, it might per-
suade the Justices to retire after serving fifteen years on the 
bench rather than continuing to serve for an additional eleven 
years.129 Finally, it would help get the Justices out of the busi-
ness of importing foreign sources of law into American constitu-
tional jurisprudence. We will say a word further on each of 
 
 127. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 101, § 401.04[5]; see also discussion su-
pra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 128. This point was made by none other than Chief Justice John Roberts 
when he worked in the Reagan administration. See discussion supra note 8 
and accompanying text. 
 129. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 73, at 24.  
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these points better to explain ourselves. 
First, we think that it is very important to get all officers of 
the federal government and members of Congress outside the 
Beltway and in contact with American grassroots opinion. 
There are big differences of opinion, as we know from recent 
elections, between Red State America and Blue State America, 
and it is the opinion of Blue State America which dominates 
Washington, D.C. Right now, Justices are far less likely to 
spend time in the hinterlands than are members of Congress, 
who return weekly to their districts, or Presidents and Vice 
Presidents, who travel nationwide. Admittedly, the Justices do 
usually attend the judicial conferences of the circuits for which 
they are circuit Justices, but they generally do this only once a 
year and for a few days at most. This is not enough contact 
with public opinion outside the Beltway to have any apprecia-
ble influence on the Justices. They also hear stay requests and 
review other papers filed with the Court that originate from 
their circuits.130 Once again, however, this is a minimal de-
mand that does not acquaint them with the problems faced by 
the district courts or with other judges’ points of view. 
Circuit riding for four weeks a year would be far less of a 
burden on Justices than that which members of Congress bear 
flying back and forth from Washington, D.C., to their districts 
or states. Four weeks would be long enough to allow circuit-
riding Justices to have lots of lunches and dinners with local 
federal court of appeals and district court judges from whom 
the Justices could learn a great deal. Local lawyers might come 
to watch Justices read jury charges, and the local press might 
cover their four-week stints back on their home turfs. We think 
all these things would be highly beneficial and that they would 
make Justices more learned and more modest than their so-
journs in Europe seem to do. 
Second, in a recent article one of us has shown that Su-
preme Court Justices are retiring at a much older age now than 
they were earlier in our history, and they are serving on the 
Court more than ten years longer on average.131 Between 1789 
and 1970, Justices served an average of fifteen years and re-
tired at about age sixty-eight, which allowed vacancies on the 
 
 130. See SUP. CT. R. 22–23, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
ctrules/rulesofthecourt.pdf. 
 131. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 73, at 23–25. 
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Court to open up once every two years.132 Between 1970 and 
the two departures from the Court in 2005, the Justices have 
served on average more than twenty-six years and have retired 
at about age seventy-nine, with vacancies on the Court opening 
up only once every three or more years.133 Many causes account 
for this complex phenomenon, and we refer anyone seeking to 
understand it to the article Professors Calabresi and James 
Lindgren have written on the subject.134 Some of the most im-
portant causes are that since 1968, the number of law clerks 
per Justice has doubled, the number of cases they hear each 
year has dropped by about half in the last fifteen years, and the 
social status of their office has greatly increased.135 We thus 
think that there are now elderly Justices remaining on the Su-
preme Court because it is a prestigious and cushy job where no 
one has to do much heavy lifting and where there is a three- 
month summer vacation. For example, at least one elderly Jus-
tice, eighty-five-year-old John Paul Stevens, reputedly lives 
part-time in Florida and has plenty of time to engage in lei-
surely activities.136 
We are troubled by this phenomenon because we think 
there is a minimal amount of physical vigor a Justice must pos-
sess to stay mentally sharp and to perform fully the job of being 
a Justice. It was Professor Calabresi’s opinion when he clerked 
at the Court from 1987 to 1988 that two Justices, William 
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, lacked the requisite physical 
strength to do their jobs, while another Justice, Harry Black-
mun, was intellectually overtaxed by his job. It appears from 
news accounts that this problem has not ceased to exist: Wil-
liam Rehnquist appears pretty clearly to have been too ill last 
year—the last year of his life—to warrant his continued service 
as a Justice.137 We need a way to get such elderly, frail Justices 
 
 132. Id. at 24, 27. 
 133. Id. at 23–27. 
 134. Id. at 30–35. 
 135. Id. at 34–35. 
 136. E.g., Anne Gearan, Rehnquist’s Death Puts Stevens in Charge, 
SFGATE.COM, Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/ 
2005/09/04/national/w075007D89.DTL (“[Stevens] speaks in public infre-
quently, and is not the constant presence at arts performances or charity func-
tions frequented by some of his colleagues. He lives part-time in Florida, and 
spends his off-hours playing competitive duplicate bridge and tennis.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Rehnquist Won’t Vote in Every Case Heard 
This Term, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2004, at A8; Luiza Ch. Savage, Rehnquist Ill, 
Making Court Election Topic, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.nysun.com/ 
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to think more seriously than they currently do about retiring. 
Circuit riding as we propose it is a reasonable way of ac-
complishing that goal. Four weeks riding circuit is a minimal 
demand to place on Justices. Healthy fifty-, sixty-, and even 
seventy-year-olds routinely try cases in the nation’s district 
courts. The work we would ask Justices to do is not strenuous 
or physically dangerous. Anyone who is so frail or so ill that 
they cannot try cases for four additional weeks a year probably 
ought not to continue to sit on the Court. We do not expect that 
Justices would like four weeks of trial duty, at least initially, 
but it is far less burdensome than what senators and con-
gressmen do in traveling back to their states and districts. We 
think it is a reasonable way to put a thumb on the scale and 
encourage, without forcing, eighty-five-year-old Justices to 
think more seriously about retirement. 
Finally, much has been written recently about the Court’s 
new-found practice of relying on foreign sources of law in cases 
like Lawrence v. Texas138 and Roper v. Simmons.139 One of us 
has written a law review article on this subject which shows 
that while the Court has in practice cited foreign sources of law 
“throughout its history,” it is only since 1958 that it has relied 
on foreign law to strike down American statutes as unconstitu-
tional.140 We share at least some of the skepticism that Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas have expressed about this 
trend, and we believe it is due in part to the extensive Euro-
pean travel that most of the Justices now do during their three-
month summer vacations. We would make Justices spend one 
of those three months back here in the United States trying 
cases. We think this would be a useful and mild corrective to 
their current practice of spending excessive amounts of time 
overseas. 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown that notwithstanding some serious dissent, 
a far more onerous form of circuit riding than what we propose 
was upheld early on in our nation’s constitutional history. Un-
der current Supreme Court case law, a circuit-riding plan of the 
type we propose ought to be upheld as constitutional. None of 
 
article/3755. 
 138. 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003). 
 139. 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). 
 140. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 7, at 755. 
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the reasons for which the original form of circuit riding was 
abolished ought to cause us today to reject a more modest form 
of circuit riding. Moreover, there are important policy benefits 
that might be obtained by reintroducing circuit riding. We rec-
ognize that we are asking Justices to do more work than they 
currently do, and so at the same time as we reintroduce circuit 
riding we would also give them a $100,000 annual pay increase. 
Reinstituting circuit riding is far less controversial than 
passing jurisdiction-stripping bills, and it is certainly less con-
stitutionally problematic. At the same time, it is something a 
simple majority of the House and the Senate can do to rein in—
if only a little bit—a very aggressive Supreme Court. We think 
circuit riding is an idea whose time has come again, and we 
hope the current Congress considers reintroducing it. 
